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"Despite a marsive infusion oj monty and manpower, no one can seriously claim that the
war on drugs in Bolivia is being won. »

Bolivia: The Politics of Cocaine
By MELVIN BURKE

Professor of Economics, University of Maine

B

OLIVIA'S sad and turbulent history continues
.to repeat itself. The coca boom of today has
replaced the tin boom of the last century,
which in turn supplanted the exploitation of silver
and other precious metals during the colonial
period. And as in the past, Bolivia's export-based
economy continues to depend on foreigners for
everything from bank loans to economic advisers.
It is impossible to understand Bolivia's current
economic situation without first understanding the
links between Bolivia's prosperity during the 1970's
and the inflation, price stabilization and stagnation
of the 1980's. The economic prosperity Bolivia enjoyed during General Hugo Banzer Suarez's reign
between 1971 and 1978 was financed with petrodollars borrowed from abroad. In less than a decade,
public debt increased from $671 million to more
than $2.5 billion. Foreign loans were supplemented
during these global inflationary years by increased
export earnings from tin and crude oil as well as illicit dollars from the booming cocaine trade.
Bolivia's so-called economic miracle, however,
was short-lived. It came to an abrupt end in late
1979, when the United States Federal Reserve
Board, following a monetarist policy to curb inflation, raised interest rates dramatically, precipitating the worldwide recession of 1980-1982.1
Prices for oil and tin collapsed, private capital fled
Bolivia, short-term foreign debts tripled between
1980 and 1982, and Bolivia fell into a debt crisis and
depression from which it has yet to recover. Not
even the Bolivian military could contain the social
unrest brought on by this economic crash, which
manifested itself in political turmoil. The four years
from 1978 to 1982 witnessed no less than nine heads
of state.

The deteriorating economic situation - combined with pressure from the international community - forced the Bolivian military to return to its
barracks in October, 1982.2 Hernan Siles Zuazo
and his Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP)
coalition, which had won the 1980 election, then
assumed power. President Siles, who had successfully implemented a stabilization program in
1957-1958, was again heir to an inflationary, nogrowth economy that was not of his making. As
economis t Jeffrey Sachs notes:
The Siles government inherited an annual inflation
rate of approximately 300 percent (October, 1982,
over October, 1981), an inability to borrow on international markets, and an economy declining sharply
in real terms (real GNP [gross national product] fell
by 6.6 percent in 1982). At the same time, the new
government was called upon to satisfy pent-up social
and economic demands.'

In an attempt to repeat his earlier historic success, Siles implemented six price stabilization plans
during his short term of office. They all failed
because his government, which included Bolivian
Communist party ministers, lacked support from
Bolivia's businesspeople and its international creditors. This lack of support led to capital flight,
devaluation of the peso and rising prices. In a
desperate attempt to stop the vicious spiral of devaluation and inflation, the Siles government ftxed
prices, wages, interest rates and the official exchange rate . The result was an increase in black
market economic transactions, which were not
taxed, and a subsequent drop in government
revenues . In a futile attempt to finance government
deftcits, the Central Bank printed more and more
money. The outcome of all these measures was the
Bolivian hyperinflation of 1984 and 1985.

'Jerry R. Ladman, cd., Modern Day Bolivia: Legacy if the
Revolution and Prospects for the Future (Tempe: Arizona State
University Press, 1982).
'James M. Malloy and Edwardo Gemarra, eds., Revolution
and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985 (New BrunswiCk, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1988), and Juan Antonio Morales, "Inflation
Stabilization in Bolivia," in Michael Bruno et al., eds. Inflation
Stabilizalzon: The Expmence if Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and
Mexico (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).
'Jeffrey Sachs, "The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization," The Amencan Economic Review, May, ) 987, p. 280.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
Hyperinflation forced Siles to call early elections
in 1985 . In the elections, former General Hugo
Banzer Suarez and his Democratic Nationalist Action (ADN) party won a plurality of 29 percent of
the vote. Victor Paz Estensorro of the National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR), however, be-
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came President with only 26 percent ot the vote
after forming an alliance with the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) of Jaime Paz Zamora.
Ironically, Paz Estensorro had been Bolivia's President during the previous period of inflation between
1952 and 1956.
President Paz Estensorro took office on August 6,
1985, and proclaimed the so-called New Economic
Policy (NEP), which included a devaluation of the
peso and a managed floating exchange rate; a cut in
government spending and deficits; a freeze on
public sector wages; elimination of government
subsidies and controls on trade and prices; and
privatization of public enterprises. This austere International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization
program was intended to do more than eliminate
inflation.
The policy succeeded in stabilizing prices, but it
did so at a high human and social cost. Public sector
employment decreased by 10 percent within a year,
the peso was devalued by nearly 100 percent and inflation fell to an annual rate of 276 percent in 1986
and 15 percent' in 1987. 4 In return for complying
with the ~MF conditions, Bolivia received increased
international financial assistance, including loans
of $225 million from the IMF, $257 million from
the World Bank and $351 million from the InterAmerican Development Bank. The Paris Club of
creditor governments also permitted Bolivia to reschedule $2 billion in debt, and it granted Bolivia
the unique privilege of repurchasing $450 million of
its foreign debt owed to commercial banks at 11
cents on the dollar, with money donated by foreign
governments. In short, Paz Estensorro's centerright government was handsomely rewarded. for
returning Bolivia's economy to an open, laissezfaire and subordinate position in the global capitalist community.
Paz Estensorro's stabilization program also led to
the privatization of the national mining company,
Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia (Comibol) and the
firing of 23,000 of the company's 30,000 miners. 5
The massive unemployment of miners was only one
'See Arthurj. Mann and Manuel Pastorjr., "Orthodox and
Heterodox Stabilization Policies in Bolivia and Peru:
1985-1988," Journal of Interamencan Studies and World Affairs, vol.
31 (Winter, 1989), pp. 170-176.
'In October, 1985, the price of tin abruptly declined by 50
percent. The International Tin Agreement and the tin market
collapsed in March, 1986, when the Tin Council ran out of
money to purchase tin stocks and support the price. john Crabtree et al., The Great Tin Crash: Bolivia and the World Tin Market
(London: Latin American Bureau, 1987).
'Carlos Serrate Reich, Interpelacidn al Neoliberalismo (La Paz:
Impresa Editorial Siglo Ltd., 1989).
'Nicklas Kaldor, "Monetarism and U.K. Monetary Policy,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 4 (1980), p. 244.
'Mann and Pastor, op. cit., p. 174.

cost of this stabilization program. Unemployment
of workers increased to an estimated 20 percent,
real wages decreased, and rural teachers quit their
jobs in record numbers. In compensation for their
reduced incomes, Bolivian government ministers
were secretly paid salaries by the United Nations. 6
If this were not enough, the government imposed a
10 percent value-added tax (VAT) on all economic
transactions in mid-1986.
Economist Nicholas Kaldor has observed that orthodox economic policy, like Bolivia's,
is no more than a convenient smokescreen providing
an ideological justification for such antisocial
measures [as 1 high interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and the consequent diminution in the
bargaining strength of labor due to unemployment. 7

There are indications today that Bolivia's high interest rate of 19 percent discourages real investment
and that the "managed" peso is seriously overvalued
by approximately 20 percent, thus reducing exports
while promoting imports. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the Bolivian Central Bank is
using drug money to stabilize its finances. Shortterm (30-day) deposits in dollars and dollar-indexed
accounts (no questions asked) increased from less
than $28 million in September, 1985, to an estimated $270 million'in March, 1987. Since then,
dollar deposits in Bolivian banks have increased to
about $700 million, and the economy has once
again been "dollar stabilized."
This stabilization, however, is not an economic
miracle. The return of finance capital (international
loans, debt reduction and drug money) to Bolivia
after 1985, the freeing of prices and regressive taxes
brought price stability to Bolivia. But the program
has not brought prosperity or social justice to the
country. On the contrary, inequality has increased,
and the economy has shrunk. Nowhere is this more
evident than on the streets of La Paz, where street
vendors and beggars contrast with the fancy boutiques, posh hotels and Mercedes-Benzes. The regressive VAT absorbs nearly 15 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) and the high-interest
dollar deposits discourage productive investment.
As a result, "real per capita GDP fell by 5.6 percent
in 1986, 0.6 percent in 1987 and 0.1 percent in
1988."8 From 1986 to 1989, Bolivia's per capita
GNP was only 74 percent of the per capita GNP in
1980, and the foreign debt of$3.5 billion absorbs 30
percent of the nation's legal export earnings.
The MNR initially paid for the high cost of its
price stabilization, losing heavily in the municipal
elections of 1987 after it received only 12 percent of
the vote. In the 1989 elections, the MNR emerged
victorious, with its new charismatic head, Gonzolo
("Goni") Sanchez de Lozado, winning a plurality of
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the vote, followed closely by Banzer and the ADN.
Paz Zamora of the MIRA, who placeda weak third,
however, was deciared President when Banzer
swung his party's votes to paz Zamora in a congressional runoff. Unofficially, it has been Banzer who
has run the country after he acquired 50 percent (17
portfolios) of the Cabinet in return for his votes.
Among the portfolios held by Banzer's ADN are the
powerful ministries of finance, defense and foreign
affairs.
President Jaime paz Zamora has vowed publicly
to continue the stabilization program and to wage
war on coca leaf producers. In return, Bolivia has
received increased financial assistance from the
United States. In 1989, Bolivia received $100
million in United States aid; $15 million was earmarked for drug interdiction and $40 million was
part of a coca substitution program. In 1990,
United States aid increased to $230 million; $33.7
million of this will go to the military if it takes part in
the drug-eradication program.
WAR IN BOLIVIA
Bolivia's miners and peasants were the soldiers of
the 1952 revolution that brought the MNR to
power and resulted in an extensive land redistribution program. However, the MNR government
was never comfortable with either the miners or the
peasants of the highlands and valleys. In its
development programs, the government heavily invested in the lowlands - Santa Cruz, the Chapare
and the Beni-where there were no unionized miners or organized Amayra-Quechua peasants, and
no land reform programs.
After 1952, most foreign aid as well as profits
from the state-owned Comibol mine went to the
lowland regions. Here sugar, cotton and cattle produced on large estates promised to become the new
base for economic development in Bolivia. The
government's objective was to move highland
peasants to the more fertile lowlands, put them to
work for agro-industrial entrepreneurs, and make
Santa Cruz and the Beni the center poles of
development.
Instead of sugar, cotton and cattle, however, the
area struck it rich with coca. Today, 80 percent of
Bolivia's coca is grown in the Chapare region, cambas (Iowlanders) dominate the drug trade, and Santa Cruz is a cocaine boomtown. But the development policy was a dismal failure even before coca
arrived. Although the lowland's share of Bolivia's
GNP increased between 1965 and 1979, agricul~de Franco and Ricardo Godoy, "The Economic Consequences of Cocaine Produqion in Bolivia: Historical , Local,
and Macroeconomic Perspectives," unpublished paper of the
Harvard Institute for International Development , June 8,
1990.
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ture's share of GNP as a whole decreased, as did
traditional peasant agriculture in the highlands.
The heavily subsidized sugar crop satisfied domestic consumption but not export needs. Many of the
loans for sugarcane, cotton and cattle were unaccounted for and became seed money for the drug·
trafticking elites.
The extent to which coca production and trade
now dominate the Bolivian economy is astounding.
Coca accounts for an estimated 30 to 40 percent of
Bolivia's agricultural production, half its GDP and
66 percent of its export earnings. Between 40,000
and 70,000 peasants produce coca, and about
500,000 Bolivians (1 in 5 of the working population)
depend on coca for a livelihood either directly or
through support industries.
The typical campesino earns between $1,000 and
$2,500 per hectare of coca plants, which is about
four times the amount he could earn from growing
oranges and avocados, the next most profitable alternative crops. He receives $2 for a kilogram of
coca leaf, which translates to between $70,000 and
$90,000 per kilogram of processed pure cocaine on
the streets in the United States. Thus, while the
coca farmer makes a living, the cocaine trafficker
makes a killing.
The huge profits made from trafficking are used
to buy airplanes, weapons, army officers and politicians in Bolivia and abroad. Only one-fifth of the
money from the Bolivian drug trade is returned to
the country. This leaves about $2.5 billion, which is
spent and banked abroad, mainly in the United
States. 9
With so much money to be made in the illicit
drug industry, the corruption of Bolivian politics is
understandable. It reached its peak on July 17,
1980, when General Luis Garcia Meza came to
power in a bloody coup. Garda Meza's was undoubtedly the most brutal, corrupt, neo-Nazi government in Bolivian history.
During the two years Garda Meza was in power,
the United States stopped all military aid to Bolivia.
The populist Siles government that followed was reluctant to accept military aid or to turn the army
against the well-organized peasants whom Siles was
attempting to woo as supporters. In an attempt to
keep the military out of the drug-control business
and at the same time convince foreign lenders that
Bolivia was willing to cooperate in the war against
drugs, Siles created an anti-drug police force, the
Mobile Rural Patrol Units (UMOPAR). This
force, which was later nicknamed the Leopards,
was entirely trained and financed by the United
States . But Siles's greatest fears were realized when
the Leopards kidnapped him in an abortive coup attempt inJuly, 1984.
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This did not deter Siles's successor, Victor Paz
Estensorro, from escalating militarization. In
mid-1986, during Paz Estensorro's administration,
the Leopards and 160 United States combat troops
raided 256 suspected cocaine paste laboratories.
They confiscated a mere 22 kilograms of the paste
(from which cocaine is refined) and arrested only
one narcotrafficker - a peasant worker. The operation, dubbed "Blast Furnace," was a failure in still
another respect. Bolivian society was outraged at
the government's unconstitutional use of foreign
troops without congressional approval.
Paz Estensorro soon focused his drug-eradication
program on two fronts: armed conflict against the
peasant coca producers and a program that paid
$2,000 for each hectare of coca plants "voluntarily"
destroyed. Both programs are financed by the
United States government.
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
On February 15, 1990, the Presidents of the
United States, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia met in
Cartagena, Colombia, to set policy for the drug
war. They agreed "to implement or strengthen a
comprehensive, intensified anti-narcotics program"
to reduce both the supply of and the demand for illegal drugs.
On May 9, 1990, the United States and Bolivia
signed an agreement that commits the Bolivian
armed forces to fight the drug war. Under this
agreement, $33.7 million in United States aid will
be distributed in 1990 to eradicate drugs. In 1991
the drug-eradication and coca-substitution aid
package is expected to total $95.8 million. 10
Despite this massive infusion of money and manpower, no one can seriously claim that the war on
drugs in Bolivia is being won. Bolivia eradicated
between 6,500 and 8,000 hectares of coca leaves in
late 1990, although it was scheduled to destroy only
6,000 hectares for the entire year. However, Bolivia
produces between 50,000 and 100,000 hectares of
coca, which means that at the present rate of destruction, it will take at least 6 to 12 years to
eliminate Bolivia's existing coca crop-if no new
production is undertaken. And the costs of relocating and compensating coca producers could be as
much as $3.5 billion. The Bolivian peasant will
most likely continue to produce coca as long as demand in the United States or in other developed
countries remains high or until viable alternative
cash crops are developed at home.
The battle against cocaine traffickers is making
little progress. On December 10, 1989, Colonel
·Luis Arce Gomez, Garda Meza's minister of inH'''Bolivia Seeks U.S. Aid to Strengthen Its Economy," Christian Scimee Monilor, February 15, 1990, p. 3.

terior, was apprehended and extradited to the
United States to face drug charges. He faced similar
charges in the Bolivian courts. Erl<in Echeverra,
Arce Gomez's right-hand man, was recently abducted and extradited to the United States and has
reportedly agreed to testify against his former boss.
Meco Dominguez, one of Bolivia's top three drug
traffickers, was also apprehended.
The arrests of these Bolivian druglords are only
the tip of the iceberg. General Garda Meza still
draws his military pension, and his case in the
Bolivian Supreme Court drags on. Banzer has been
neither arrested nor charged and remains the head
of Bolivia's major political party and the recognized
power behind President Paz Zamora.
Corruption is most evident in the banking system, where "cocaine stabilization" is the norm.
Most Bolivian drug money is laundered in the international banking system, which includes United
States and Panamanian banks. The largest private
bank in Bolivia, the Santa Cruz Bank, has offices in
Panama and Miami.
Drug launderers and their bankers, however, are
not targets of the military in its brave new drug war.
Drug money is withdrawn from Bolivian banks
whenever the government takes action against the
druglords or when they do not support or cannot
control the government. This capital is repatriated
when the druglords feel safe or when they support
the government, which has been the case in Bolivia
since 1985.
The drug money deposits and repatriation explain why Bolivia's currency and price levels have
stabilized since 1985. This policy obviously serves
the interests of the new illegitimate bourgeoisie and
the "narco-generals" of Bolivia. It also apparently
serves the United States national interest, inasmuch as money laundering has not only been tolerated by the United States but has, in fact, been encouraged. The latest program to privatize Bolivia's
public enterprises is a case in point.
There is little doubt that much of the investment
capital used by Bolivia's new entrepreneurs is drug
money. Privatization will further legitimize cocaine
profits and make respectable businesspeople of the
(Continued on page 90)
Melvin Burke has taught, researched and consulted extensively in many Latin American countries. His studies of Bolivia include La Corporacion
Minera de Bolivia (Comihol) and the Tncmgular Plan: A
Case Study in Dependency, Latin American Issues, no.
4 (Meadville, Penn.: Allegeny College and University of Akron, 1987), and "The Stabilization Programs of the International Monetary Fund: The
Case of Bolivia," Marxist Perspectives, vol. 2, no. 2
(Summer, 1979).
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BOLIVIA
(Continued from page 68)
Bolivian cocaine traffickers. This is not a bad policy
in the long run. But drug trafficking is much more
profitable than running an airline or a brewery.
Bolivia's druglords thus may not abandon their illegitimate drug trade but simply use the privatized
companies as new fronts for money laundering.
While the drug traffickers face the prospect of
acquiring respectability and legitimacy, the poor
peasant coca growers struggle to survlve agamst the
combined armed might of the United States and
Bolivian militaries . In November, 1990, 1,600
combat regulars of the Bolivian army were ordered
to the Chapare to wage war against the coca growers . Bolivia's peasants will undoubtedly resist this
repression as did the Bolivian miners before them .
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